Debt Crises and Risk Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns

Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Emiliano Luttini and Bent Sorensen

No 19914, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Using a variance decomposition of shocks to GDP, we quantify the role of international factor income, international transfers, and saving in achieving risk sharing during the recent European crisis. We focus on the sub-periods 1990-2007, 2008-2009, and 2010 and consider separately the European countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. We decompose risk sharing from saving into contributions from government and private saving and show that fiscal austerity programs played an important role in hindering risk sharing during the sovereign debt crisis.

JEL-codes: E2 E6 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-opm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Published as Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan & Emiliano Luttini & Bent Sørensen, 2014. "Debt Crises and Risk-Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(1), pages 253-276, 01.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Debt Crises and Risk‐Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns (2014)
Working Paper: Debt Crises and Risk Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns (2013)
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