The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability

Hugh Macartney

No 19915, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper provides the first evidence that value-added education accountability schemes induce dynamic distortions. Extending earlier dynamic moral hazard models, I propose a new test for ratchet effects, showing that classroom inputs are distorted less when schools face a shorter horizon over which they can influence student performance. I then exploit grade span variation using rich educational data to credibly identify the extent of dynamic gaming, finding compelling evidence of ratchet effects based on a triple-differences approach. Further analysis indicates that these effects are driven primarily by effort distortions, with teacher reallocations playing a secondary role.

JEL-codes: D82 I21 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-edu, nep-hrm and nep-ure
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Published as Hugh Macartney, 2016. "The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability," Journal of Labor Economics, vol 34(1), pages 1-28.

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