Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers

Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken and Matthew Weinberg ()

No 19939, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork viewed most mergers as either competitively neutral or efficiency enhancing. In his view, only mergers creating a dominant firm or monopoly were likely to harm consumers. Bork was especially skeptical of oligopoly concerns resulting from mergers. In this paper, we provide a critique of Bork's views on merger policy from The Antitrust Paradox. Many of Bork's recommendations have been implemented over time and have improved merger analysis. Bork's proposed horizontal merger policy, however, was too permissive. In particular, the empirical record shows that mergers in oligopolistic markets can raise consumer prices.

JEL-codes: K21 L1 L4 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-law
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Published as Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, 2014. "Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(S3), pages S67 - S100.

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