Household Demand for Low Carbon Public Policies: Evidence from California

Matthew Holian and Matthew Kahn

No 19965, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In recent years, Californians have voted on two key pieces of low carbon regulation. The resulting voting patterns provide an opportunity to examine the demand for carbon mitigation efforts. Household voting patterns are found to mirror the voting patterns by the U.S Congress on national carbon legislation. Political liberals and more educated voters favor such regulations while suburbanites tend to oppose such initiatives. Survey responses at the individual level are shown to predict the spatial variation in actual voting patterns and hence convergent validity for results obtained with stated preference data on voting markets.

JEL-codes: Q54 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-pol
Note: EEE PE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published as Household Demand for Low Carbon Policies: Evidence from California Matthew J. Holian and Matthew E. Kahn Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 2015 2:2, 205-234

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