Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining

S. Nageeb Ali (), B. Douglas Bernheim and Xiaochen Fan

No 20011, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between the concentration of political power in legislative bargaining and the predictability of the process governing the recognition of legislators. Our main result establishes that, for a broad class of legislative bargaining games, if the recognition procedure permits the legislators to rule out some minimum number of proposers one round in advance, then irrespective of how patient the individual legislators are, Markovian equilibria necessarily deliver all economic surplus to the first proposer. We also examine the extent to which alternative bargaining protocols can limit the concentration of power.

JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
Note: PE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as S Nageeb Ali & B Douglas Bernheim & Xiaochen Fan, 2019. "Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, vol 86(2), pages 500-525.

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Journal Article: Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining (2019)
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