The Geography of Financial Misconduct

Christopher A. Parsons, Johan Sulaeman and Sheridan Titman

No 20347, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We find that a firm's tendency to engage in financial misconduct increases with the misconduct rates of neighboring firms. This appears to be caused by peer effects, rather than exogenous shocks like regional variation in enforcement. Effects are stronger among firms of comparable size, and among CEOs of similar age. Moreover, local waves of financial misconduct correspond with local waves of non-financial corruption, such as political fraud.

JEL-codes: G0 K42 M41 R0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-law and nep-ure
Note: CF
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published as CHRISTOPHER A. PARSONS & JOHAN SULAEMAN & SHERIDAN TITMAN, 2018. "The Geography of Financial Misconduct," The Journal of Finance, vol 73(5), pages 2087-2137.

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