Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News
Cosmin Ilut,
Matthias Kehrig and
Martin Schneider
No 20473, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
Concave hiring rules imply that firms respond more to bad shocks than to good shocks. They provide a unified explanation for several seemingly unrelated facts about employment growth in macro and micro data. In particular, they generate countercyclical movement in both aggregate conditional “macro” volatility and cross-sectional “micro” volatility, as well as negative skewness in the cross-section and in the time series at different levels of aggregation. Concave establishment-level responses of employment growth to TFP shocks estimated from Census data induce significant skewness, movements in volatility and amplification of bad aggregate shocks.
JEL-codes: D2 D8 E20 J2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-mac
Note: EFG
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
Published as Cosmin Ilut & Matthias Kehrig & Martin Schneider, 2018. "Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News," Journal of Political Economy, vol 126(5), pages 2011-2071.
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Related works:
Journal Article: Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News (2018) 
Working Paper: Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News (2017) 
Working Paper: Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News (2017) 
Working Paper: Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News (2015) 
Working Paper: Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News (2014) 
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