Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices

Andrea M. Buffa, Dimitri Vayanos and Paul Woolley

No 20480, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets have high volatility, and the risk-return relationship becomes inverted. Noise traders bias prices upward because constraints make it harder for managers to underweight overvalued assets, which have high volatility, than to overweight undervalued ones. We endogenize the constraints based on investors' uncertainty about managers' skill, and show that asset-pricing implications can be significant even for moderate numbers of unskilled managers.

JEL-codes: D86 G12 G14 G18 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
Note: AP
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

Published as Andrea M. Buffa & Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, 2022. "Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices," Journal of Political Economy, vol 130(12), pages 3146-3201.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Asset management contracts and equilibrium prices (2022)
Working Paper: Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices (2014)
Working Paper: Asset management contracts and equilibrium prices (2014)
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