A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation

Steven Shavell (shavell@law.harvard.edu)

No 20747, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The deterrence of crime and its reduction through incapacitation are studied in a simple multiperiod model of crime and law enforcement. Optimal imprisonment sanctions and the optimal probability of sanctions are determined. A point of emphasis is that the incapacitation of individuals is often socially desirable even when they are potentially deterrable. The reason is that successful deterrence may require a relatively high probability of sanctions and thus a relatively high enforcement expense. In contrast, incapacitation may yield benefits no matter how low the probability of sanctions is—implying that incapacitation may be superior to deterrence.

JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
Note: LE
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Published as Steven Shavell, 2015. "A simple model of optimal deterrence and incapacitation," International Review of Law and Economics, vol 42, pages 13-19.

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