College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea

Christopher Avery, Soohyung Lee and Alvin Roth

No 20774, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines non-price competition among colleges to attract highly qualified students, exploiting the South Korean setting where the national government sets rules governing applications. We identify some basic facts about the behavior of colleges before and after a 1994 policy change that changed the timing of the national college entrance exam and introduced early admissions, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches those facts. When applications reveal information about students that is of common interest to all colleges, lower-ranked colleges can gain in competition with higher-ranked colleges by limiting the number of possible applications.

JEL-codes: C78 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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