Are Patent Fees Effective at Weeding out Low-quality Patents?

Gaétan de Rassenfosse and Adam Jaffe

No 20785, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The paper investigates whether patent fees are an effective mechanism to deter the filing of low-quality patent applications. The study analyzes the effect on patent quality of the Patent Law Amendment Act of 1982, which resulted in a substantial increase in patenting fees at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Results from a series of difference-in-differences regressions suggest that the increase in fees led to a weeding out of low-quality patents. About 14 per cent of patents in the lowest quality decile were filtered out, and the effect was especially visible for companies with a large patent portfolio. The study has strong policy implications in the current context of concerns about declines in patent quality.

JEL-codes: K2 O31 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-law and nep-tid
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Published as Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Adam B. Jaffe, 2018. "Are patent fees effective at weeding out low-quality patents?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol 27(1), pages 134-148.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Are patent fees effective at weeding out low‐quality patents? (2018)
Working Paper: Are Patent Fees Effective at Weeding Out Low-Quality Patents? (2015)
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