Old and Young Politicians

Alberto Alesina, Ugo antonio Troiano and Traviss Cassidy

No 20977, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We evaluate the effect of a politician’s age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity.

JEL-codes: C21 D78 H72 H77 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-eur, nep-lab, nep-mfd and nep-pol
Note: PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published as Alberto Alesina & Traviss Cassidy & Ugo Troiano, 2019. "Old and Young Politicians," Economica, vol 86(344), pages 689-727.

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