Above a Swamp: A Theory of High-Quality Scientific Production

Bralind Kiri, Nicola Lacetera and Lorenzo Zirulia

No 21143, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We elaborate a model of the incentives of scientists to perform activities of control and criticism when these activities, just like the production of novel findings, are costly, and we study the strategic interaction between these incentives. We then use the model to assess policies meant to enhance the reliability of scientific knowledge. We show that a certain fraction of low-quality science characterizes all the equilibria in the basic model. In fact, the absence of detected low-quality research can be interpreted as the lack of verification activities and thus as a potential limitation to the reliability of a field. Incentivizing incremental research and verification activities improves the expected quality of research; this effect, however, is contrasted by the incentives to free ride on performing verification if many scientists are involved, and may discourage scientists to undertake new research in the first place. Finally, softening incentives to publish does not enhance quality, although it increases the fraction of detected low-quality papers. We also advance empirical predictions and discuss the insights for firms and investors as they "scout" the scientific landscape.

JEL-codes: L31 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-sog
Note: PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Bralind Kiri & Nicola Lacetera & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2018. "Above a swamp: A theory of high-quality scientific production," Research Policy, .

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