The Effect of Hospital/Physician Integration on Hospital Choice

Laurence C. Baker, M. Kate Bundorf and Daniel P. Kessler

No 21497, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper, we estimate how hospital ownership of physicians’ practices affects their patients’ hospital choices. We match data on the hospital admissions of Medicare beneficiaries, including the identity of their admitting physician, with data on the identity of the owner of the admitting physician’s practice. We find that a hospital's ownership of an admitting physician’s practice dramatically increases the probability that the physician's patients will choose the owning hospital. We also find that patients are more likely to choose a high-cost, low-quality hospital when their admitting physician’s practice is owned by that hospital.

JEL-codes: I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
Note: EH
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Laurence C. Baker & M. Kate Bundorf & Daniel P. Kessler, 2016. "The Effect of Hospital/Physician Integration on Hospital Choice," Journal of Health Economics, .

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