Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management

Nicolae B. Gârleanu and Lasse Pedersen

No 21563, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform after fees, and the net performance of the average manager depends on the number of "noise allocators." Finally, we show why large investors should be active and discuss broader implications and welfare considerations.

JEL-codes: D4 D53 D83 G02 G12 G14 G23 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk
Note: AP
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published as NICOLAE GÂRLEANU & LASSE HEJE PEDERSEN, 2018. "Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management," The Journal of Finance, vol 73(4), pages 1663-1712.

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Journal Article: Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management (2018)
Working Paper: Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management (2018)
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