Democratic Rulemaking

John M. de Figueiredo and Edward H. Stiglitz

No 21765, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.

JEL-codes: K0 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-pol
Note: LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as de Figueiredo, John M., and Jed Stiglitz (2017). “Democratic Rulemaking,” in ed. Francesco Parisi, Oxford Handbook on Law and Economics, Chapter 3, Volume 3: 37-58.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21765.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21765

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21765

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().