Externalities and Benefit Design in Health Insurance

Amanda Starc and Robert Town

No 21783, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Insurance plan design has important implications for consumer welfare. In this paper, we model insurance design in the Medicare prescription drug coverage market and show that strategic private insurer incentives impose a fiscal externality on the traditional Medicare program. We document that plans covering medical expenses have more generous drug coverage than plans that are only responsible for prescription drug spending, which translates into higher drug utilization by enrollees. The effect is driven by drugs that reduce medical expenditure and treat chronic conditions. Our equilibrium model of plan design endogenizes plan characteristics and accounts for selection; the model estimates confirm that differential incentives to internalize medical care offsets can explain disparities across plans. Counterfactuals show that strategic insurer incentives are as important as selection in determining endogenous plan characteristics.

JEL-codes: I13 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
Note: EH IO
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Amanda Starc & Robert J Town, 2020. "Externalities and Benefit Design in Health Insurance," The Review of Economic Studies, vol 87(6), pages 2827-2858.

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