The Political Economy of Government Debt

Alberto Alesina and Andrea Passalacqua

No 21821, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper critically reviews the literature which explains why and under which circumstances governments accumulate more debt than it would be consistent with optimal fiscal policy. We also discuss numerical rules or institutional designs which might lead to a moderation of these distortions.

JEL-codes: E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-pol
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Chapter: The Political Economy of Government Debt (2016)
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