Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency and Borrower Runs: Loan Repayment Delays in Italy

Fabio Schiantarelli, Massimiliano Stacchini and Philip E. Strahan

No 22034, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Exposure to liquidity risk makes banks vulnerable to runs from both depositors and from wholesale, short-term investors. This paper shows empirically that banks are also vulnerable to run-like behavior from borrowers who delay their loan repayments (default). Firms in Italy defaulted more against banks with high levels of past losses. We control for borrower fundamentals with firm-quarter fixed effects; thus, identification comes from a firm's choice to default against one bank versus another, depending upon their health. This `selective' default increases where legal enforcement is weak. Poor enforcement thus can create a systematic loan risk by encouraging borrowers to default en masse once the continuation value of their bank relationships comes into doubt.

JEL-codes: G02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
Note: CF
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Chapter: Bank quality, judicial efficiency and borrower runs: loan repayment delays in Italy (2017)
Working Paper: Bank quality, judicial efficiency and borrower runs: loan repayment delays in Italy (2016)
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