The Value of Trading Relationships in Turbulent Times

Marco Di Maggio, Amir Kermani and Zhaogang Song

No 22332, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper investigates the ways in which the network of relationships between dealers shapes their trading behavior in the corporate bond market. They charge lower spreads to dealers with whom they have the strongest ties, and this effect is all the more pronounced at times of market turmoil. Moreover, highly connected and systemically important dealers exploit their connections at the expense of peripheral dealers as well as clients, charging higher markups than to other core dealers, especially during periods of uncertainty. We show that following the collapse of a flagship dealer in 2008, trading chains lengthened by almost 20 percent and that the increase was even greater for the institutions that had the closest ties with the defaulted dealer. Finally, we find evidence that dealers drastically reduced their inventory during the financial crisis. These results can help inform the debate on the risks posed by the interconnectedness of the financial system, showing how this could be a source of market fragility and illiquidity.

JEL-codes: G01 G12 G14 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mst
Note: AP
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22332.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22332

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22332

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().