The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Introduction and Summary

Laurence Ball

No 22410, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Why did the Federal Reserve let Lehman Brothers fail? Fed officials say they lacked the legal authority to rescue the firm, because it did not have adequate collateral to borrow the cash it needed. This paper summarizes a monograph that disputes officials’ claims (Ball, 2016). These claims are incorrect in two senses: a perceived lack of legal authority was not why the Fed did not rescue Lehman; and the Fed did in fact have the authority for a rescue.

JEL-codes: E52 E58 E65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-mon
Note: ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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