Patent Disclosures and Standard-Setting

Josh Lerner, Haris Tabakovic and Jean Tirole

No 22768, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A key role of standard setting organizations (SSOs) is to aggregate information on relevant intellectual property (IP) claims before deciding on a standard. This article explores the firms’ strategies in response to IP disclosure requirements—in particular, the choice between specific and generic disclosures of IP—and the optimal response by SSOs, including the royalty rate setting. We show that firms with a stronger downstream presence are more likely to opt for a generic disclosure, as are those with lower quality patents. We empirically examine patent disclosures made to seven large SSOs, and find results consistent with theoretical predictions.

JEL-codes: L24 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-mic and nep-sbm
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