Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision

T. Renee Bowen, George Georgiadis and Nicolas Lambert

No 22772, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project, and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent’s preferred scope shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent’s degree of efficiency is a key determinant of control over project scopes. From a welfare perspective, it may be desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent.

JEL-codes: C73 D70 D78 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
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Published as T. Renee Bowen & George Georgiadis & Nicolas S. Lambert, 2019. "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol 11(1), pages 243-298.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision (2019)
Working Paper: Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision (2016)
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