Discrimination as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from French Grocery Stores

Dylan Glover, Amanda Pallais and William Parienté ()

No 22786, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Examining the performance of cashiers in a French grocery store chain, we find that manager bias negatively affects minority job performance. In the stores studied, cashiers work with different managers on different days and their schedules are determined quasi-randomly. When minority cashiers, but not majority cashiers, are scheduled to work with managers who are biased (as determined by an Implicit Association Test), they are absent more often, spend less time at work, scan items more slowly, and take more time between customers. Manager bias has consequences for the average performance of minority workers: while on average minority and majority workers perform equivalently, on days where managers are unbiased, minorities perform significantly better than do majority workers. This appears to be because biased managers interact less with minorities, leading minorities to exert less effort.

JEL-codes: J24 J71 J78 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lma and nep-ure
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Dylan Glover & Amanda Pallais & William Pariente, 2017. "Discrimination as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from French Grocery Stores*," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 132(3), pages 1219-1260.

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Journal Article: Discrimination as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from French Grocery Stores (2017)
Working Paper: Discrimination as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from French Grocery Stores (2016)
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