Crime and Durable Goods

Sebastian Galiani, Laura Jaitman and Federico Weinschelbaum

No 22788, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop a theoretical model to study how changes in the durability of the goods affects prices of stolen goods, the incentives to steal and the equilibrium crime rate. When studying the production of durable goods, we find that the presence of crime affects consumer and producer surplus and thus their behaviour, market equilibrium, and, in turn, the social optimum. Lower durability of goods reduces the incentive to steal those goods, thus reducing crime. When crime is included in the standard framework of durable goods, the socially optimal durability level is lower. When considering different stealing technologies, perfect competition either over-produces durability or produces zero (minimum) durability. The monopolist under-produces durability. The model has a clear policy implication: the durability of goods, and the market structure for those goods, can be an effective instrument to reduce crime. In particular, making the durability of a good contingent upon that good being stolen is likely to increase welfare. We also study the incentives to develop and use this optimal technology.

JEL-codes: K0 K00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Note: DEV
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Sebastian Galiani & Laura Jaitman & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2020. "Crime and durable goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol 173, pages 146-163.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Crime and durable goods (2020)
Working Paper: Crime and Durable Goods (2018)
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