CEO Behavior and Firm Performance

Oriana Bandiera, Stephen Hansen, Andrea Prat and Raffaella Sadun

No 23248, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We measure the behavior of 1,114 CEOs in six countries parsing granular CEO diary data through an unsupervised machine learning algorithm. The algorithm uncovers two distinct behavioral types: “leaders” and “managers”. Leaders focus on multi-function, high-level meetings, while managers focus on one-to-one meetings with core functions. Firms with leader CEOs are on average more productive, and this difference arises only after the CEO is hired. The data is consistent with horizontal differentiation of CEO behavioral types, and firm-CEO matching frictions. We estimate that 17% of sample CEOs are mismatched, and that mismatches are associated with significant productivity losses.

JEL-codes: J22 J24 M12 O4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-eur, nep-hrm and nep-lma
Note: PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

Published as Oriana Bandiera & Andrea Prat & Stephen Hansen & Raffaella Sadun, 2020. "CEO Behavior and Firm Performance," Journal of Political Economy, vol 128(4), pages 1325-1369.

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Related works:
Journal Article: CEO Behavior and Firm Performance (2020)
Working Paper: CEO behavior and firm performance (2020)
Working Paper: CEO Behavior and Firm Performance (2017)
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