Voter Mobilization and Trust in Electoral Institutions: Evidence from Kenya

Benjamin Marx, Vincent Pons and Tavneet Suri

No 23946, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In a large-scale randomized experiment implemented with Kenya’s Electoral Commission in 2013, text messages intended to mobilize voters boosted electoral participation. However, the messages also decreased trust in electoral institutions after the election. This decrease was stronger for individuals on the losing side of the election and in areas that experienced election-related violence. We hypothesize that the mobilization campaign backfired because the Electoral Commission promised a transparent and orderly electoral process but failed to deliver on these expectations. Several potential mechanisms account for the intervention’s unexpected effects, including a simple model where signaling capacity via mobilization messages can negatively affect beliefs about the fairness of the election.

JEL-codes: O55 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Published as Benjamin Marx & Vincent Pons & Tavneet Suri, 2021. "Voter Mobilisation and Trust in Electoral Institutions: Evidence from Kenya," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(638), pages 2585-2612.

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Journal Article: Voter Mobilisation and Trust in Electoral Institutions: Evidence from Kenya (2021)
Working Paper: Voter Mobilisation and Trust in Electoral Institutions: Evidence from Kenya (2021)
Working Paper: Voter Mobilisation and Trust in Electoral Institutions: Evidence from Kenya (2021)
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