Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns

Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner and Yao Zeng

No 23981, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Using novel contract-level data, we study the recent trend in open-end mutual funds investing in unicorns—highly valued, privately held start-ups—and the consequences of these investments for corporate governance provisions. Larger funds and those with more stable funding are more likely to invest in unicorns. Compared to venture capital groups (VCs), mutual funds have weaker cash flow rights and are less involved in terms of corporate governance, being particularly underrepresented on boards of directors. Having to carefully manage their own liquidity pushes mutual funds to require stronger redemption rights, suggesting contractual choices consistent with mutual funds’ short-term capital sources.

JEL-codes: G23 G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-ent and nep-fmk
Note: PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Sergey Chernenko & Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng & Francesca Cornelli, 2021. "Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns," The Review of Financial Studies, vol 34(5), pages 2362-2410.

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Journal Article: Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns (2021)
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