EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi party

Gregori Galofré-Vilà, Christopher Meissner, Martin McKee and David Stuckler

No 24106, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the link between fiscal austerity and Nazi electoral success. Voting data from a thousand districts and a hundred cities for four elections between 1930 and 1933 shows that areas more affected by austerity (spending cuts and tax increases) had relatively higher vote shares for the Nazi party. We also find that the localities with relatively high austerity experienced relatively high suffering (measured by mortality rates) and these areas’ electorates were more likely to vote for the Nazi party. Our findings are robust to a range of specifications including an instrumental variable strategy and a border-pair policy discontinuity design.

JEL-codes: E6 N1 N14 N44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his, nep-mac, nep-pke and nep-pol
Note: DAE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Published as Gregori Galofré-Vilà & Christopher M. Meissner & Martin McKee & David Stuckler, 2021. "Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party," The Journal of Economic History, vol 81(1), pages 81-113.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24106.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Austerity and the Rise of the Nazi Party (2021) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24106

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24106

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24106