Incentivizing Better Quality of Care: The Role of Medicaid and Competition in the Nursing Home Industry

Martin Hackmann

No 24133, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper develops a model of the nursing home industry to investigate the quality effects of policies that either raise regulated reimbursement rates or increase local competition. Using data from Pennsylvania, I estimate the parameters of the model. The findings indicate that nursing homes increase the quality of care, measured by the number of skilled nurses per resident, by 8.8% following a universal 10% increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates. In contrast, I find that pro-competitive policies lead to only small increases in skilled nurse staffing ratios, suggesting that Medicaid increases are more cost effective in raising the quality of care.

JEL-codes: I11 I18 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-hea
Note: AG EH IO PE
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Published as Martin B. Hackmann, 2019. "Incentivizing Better Quality of Care: The Role of Medicaid and Competition in the Nursing Home Industry," American Economic Review, vol 109(5), pages 1684-1716.

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Journal Article: Incentivizing Better Quality of Care: The Role of Medicaid and Competition in the Nursing Home Industry (2019)
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