Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability

Jessica Leight, Dana Foarta, Rohini Pande and Laura Ralston

No 24194, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Community targeting of vote payments — defined as the saturation of entire neighborhoods with cash prior to elections — is widespread in the developing world. In this paper, we utilize laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya to demonstrate that, relative to individual targeting, a vote-buying regime that distributes payments widely renders voters more tolerant of politician rent-seeking, and increases the level of politician rent-seeking observed in equilibrium. The most parsimonious model of preferences consistent with these patterns is a model in which both politicians and voters are characterized by multifaceted social preferences, encompassing reciprocity, altruism, and inequality aversion.

JEL-codes: O1 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: DEV POL
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Published as Leight, Jessica & Foarta, Dana & Pande, Rohini & Ralston, Laura, 2020. "Value for money? Vote-buying and politician accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).

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Related works:
Journal Article: Value for money? Vote-buying and politician accountability (2020)
Working Paper: Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability (2018)
Working Paper: Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability (2017)
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