Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages?

Efraim Benmelech, Nittai Bergman and Hyunseob Kim

No 24307, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze the effect of local-level labor market concentration on wages. Using Census data over the period 1977–2009, we find that: (1) local-level employer concentration exhibits substantial cross-sectional and time-series variation and increases over time; (2) consistent with labor market monopsony power, there is a negative relation between local-level employer concentration and wages that is more pronounced at high levels of concentration and increases over time; (3) the negative relation between labor market concentration and wages is stronger when unionization rates are low; (4) the link between productivity growth and wage growth is stronger when labor markets are less concentrated; and (5) exposure to greater import competition from China (the “China Shock”) is associated with more concentrated labor markets. These five results emphasize the role of local-level labor market monopsonies in influencing firm wage-setting behavior and can potentially explain some of the stagnation of wages in the United States over the past several decades.

JEL-codes: E24 J21 J23 J31 J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma, nep-mac and nep-ure
Note: CF EFG LS PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (113)

Published as Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman & Hyunseob Kim, 2022. "Strong Employers and Weak Employees," Journal of Human Resources, vol 57(S), pages S200-S250.

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Working Paper: Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages? (2018)
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