Bank Examiners’ Information and Expertise and Their Role in Monitoring and Disciplining Banks Before and During the Panic of 1893

Charles Calomiris and Mark Carlson

No 24460, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We examine whether examiners were informed and contributed to the health of the banking sector. Information included quantitative information that was eventually made public, quantitative information that remained private, and subjective information dependent on the examiner’s production of additional, “soft” information that informed examiner assessments of the quality of bank assets and management. All three types of information were useful for gauging the condition of the bank, and affected bank behavior, including a publicly observable signal (skipping a dividend payment). Participants in the market for bank liabilities reacted to this signal in ways that promoted market discipline.

JEL-codes: G21 G28 N21 N41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
Note: CF DAE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & MARK CARLSON, 2022. "Bank Examiners’ Information and Expertise and their Role in Monitoring and Disciplining Banks Before and During the Panic of 1893," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol 54(2-3), pages 381-423.

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Journal Article: Bank Examiners’ Information and Expertise and their Role in Monitoring and Disciplining Banks Before and During the Panic of 1893 (2022)
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