Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment: Beyond Lucas-Stokey

Davide Debortoli, Ricardo Nunes and Pierre Yared

No 24522, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: According to the Lucas-Stokey result, a government can structure its debt maturity to guarantee commitment to optimal fiscal policy by future governments. In this paper, we overturn this conclusion, showing that it does not generally hold in the same model and under the same definition of time-consistency as in Lucas-Stokey. Our argument rests on the existence of an overlooked commitment problem that cannot be remedied with debt maturity: a government in the future will not tax on the downward slopping side of the Laffer curve, even if it is ex-ante optimal to do so. In light of this finding, we propose a new framework to characterize time-consistent policy. We consider a Markov Perfect Competitive Equilibrium, where a government reoptimizes sequentially and may deviate from the optimal commitment policy. We find that, in a deterministic economy, any stationary distribution of debt maturity must be flat, with the government owing the same amount at all future dates.

JEL-codes: E62 H21 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac, nep-pbe and nep-pub
Note: EFG PE POL
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Working Paper: Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment: Beyond Lucas-Stokey (2019)
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