From Revolving Doors to Regulatory Capture? Evidence from Patent Examiners

Haris Tabakovic and Thomas G. Wollmann

No 24638, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Many regulatory agency employees are hired by the firms they regulate, creating a "revolving door" between the public and private sectors. We study these transitions using detailed data from the US Patent and Trademark Office. We find that patent examiners grant significantly more patents to the firms that later hire them and that leniency extends to prospective employers. Effects are strongest in years when firms are actively hiring examiners (e.g., all else equal, our estimates are attenuated during recessions). Conditional on being granted, affected patents have broader scope, as measured by claims, and lower quality, as measured by forward citations.

JEL-codes: D72 K23 L51 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ict, nep-ipr, nep-law and nep-reg
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