Racial Divisions and Criminal Justice: Evidence from Southern State Courts

Benjamin Feigenberg and Conrad Miller

No 24726, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The US criminal justice system is exceptionally punitive. We test whether racial heterogeneity is one cause, exploiting cross-jurisdiction variation in punishment in four Southern states. We estimate the causal effect of jurisdiction on arrest charge outcome, validating our estimates using a quasi-experimental research design based on defendants charged in multiple jurisdictions. Consistent with a model of in-group bias in electorate preferences, the relationship between local punishment severity and black population share follows an inverted U-shape. Within states, defendants are 27%-54% more likely to be sentenced to incarceration in ‘peak’ heterogeneous jurisdictions than in homogeneous jurisdictions.

JEL-codes: J15 K14 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-ure
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Published as Benjamin Feigenberg & Conrad Miller, 2021. "Racial Divisions and Criminal Justice: Evidence from Southern State Courts," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol 13(2), pages 207-240.

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