Dynamics and Efficiency in Decentralized Online Auction Markets

Kenneth Hendricks and Alan Sorensen

No 25002, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Economic theory suggests that decentralized markets can achieve efficient outcomes if buyers and sellers have many opportunities to trade. We examine this idea empirically by developing a tractable dynamic model of bidding in an overlapping, sequential auction environment and estimating the model with detailed data from eBay. Bidders in the model discount their bids to reflect the option value of losing – if they lose, they can come back to try again – and the structure of the model makes it so they effectively bid against a stationary distribution of rivals. We find that dynamic participation makes the market meaningfully more efficient than a benchmark in which buyers have only one opportunity to bid, but the observed outcomes still fall well short of the fully efficient competitive equilibrium.

JEL-codes: D10 D4 D44 D47 L0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-des
Note: IO
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