Skill versus Voice in Local Development

Katherine Casey, Rachel Glennerster, Edward Miguel and Maarten Voors ()

No 25022, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Where the state is weak, traditional authorities control the local provision of public goods. These leaders come from an older, less educated generation and often rule in an authoritarian and exclusionary fashion. This means the skills of community members may not be leveraged in policy making. We experimentally evaluate two solutions to this problem in Sierra Leone: one encourages delegation to higher skill individuals and a second fosters broader inclusion in decision-making. In a real-world infrastructure grants competition, a public nudge to delegate lead to better outcomes than the default of chiefly control, whereas attempts to boost participation were largely ineffective.

JEL-codes: H41 I25 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-ppm
Note: DEV POL
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Published as Katherine Casey & Rachel Glennerster & Edward Miguel & Maarten Voors, 2023. "Skill Versus Voice in Local Development," The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol 105(2), pages 311-326.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Skill Versus Voice in Local Development (2023)
Working Paper: Skill versus Voice in Local Development (2021)
Working Paper: Skill versus Voice in Local Development (2019)
Working Paper: Skill Versus Voice in Local Development (2018)
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