How Elastic is the Demand for Tax Havens? Evidence from the US Possessions Corporations Tax Credit

Daniel G. Garrett and Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato

No 25516, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Why do some firms adopt certain tax havens and how sensitive is the demand for tax havens? We address these questions by studying how the repeal of Section 936 tax credits affected firms with affiliates in Puerto Rico. We first describe the characteristics of US multinationals that were exposed to Section 936. We then show that the market value of exposed firms decreased after losing access to Section 936, implying that firms could not perfectly substitute to other tax havens. Finally, we find that firms exposed to Section 936 did not respond by expanding their network of tax havens.

JEL-codes: F21 F23 H25 H26 H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Published as Daniel Garrett & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2019. "How Elastic is the Demand for Tax Havens? Evidence from the US Possessions Corporations Tax Credit," AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol 109, pages 493-499.

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