A Study of Exclusionary Coalitions: The Canadian Sugar Coalition, 1888–1889

John Asker and C. Scott Hemphill

No 25856, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper we examine exclusion accomplished by a coalition of firms—frequently, a coalition of suppliers and customers—that share the benefits of exclusion. As a particular historical example, we study the Canadian sugar industry of the 1880s, which was controlled by a complex coalition of refiners and wholesalers. We assess the incentives and conduct of the parties as revealed in the records of a House of Commons inquiry into anticompetitive practices in the industry. Drawing upon this example, we identify and evaluate several doctrinal approaches to establishing antitrust liability for anticompetitive exclusionary coalitions.

JEL-codes: D43 K21 L40 L41 L42 N81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-his, nep-ind and nep-law
Note: IO
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w25856.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25856

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w25856

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().