Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

Isaac Mbiti, Mauricio Romero and Youdi Schipper

No 25903, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We use a field experiment in Tanzania to compare the effectiveness on learning of two teacher performance pay systems. The first is a Pay for Percentile system (a rank-order tournament). The second rewards teachers based on multiple proficiency thresholds. Pay for Percentile can (under certain conditions) induce optimal effort among teachers, but our threshold system is easier to implement and provides teachers with clearer goals and targets. Both systems improved student test scores. However, the multiple-thresholds system was more effective in boosting student learning and is less costly.

JEL-codes: C93 H52 I21 M52 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-ure
Note: CH DEV ED
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Isaac Mbiti & Mauricio Romero & Youdi Schipper, 2023. "Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania*," The Economic Journal, vol 133(653), pages 1968-2000.

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