The Political Economy of Social Security Reform

Michael J. Boskin, Diego J. Perez and Daniel S. Bennett

No 25985, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We identify which types of Social Security reforms are supported when people vote in their financial self-interest, under alternative economic and demographic projections and voting proclivity assumptions. While 40% of voters have negative lifetime net transfers, less than 10% have negative future transfers under the un- sustainable status quo. Framing the problem as a choice between reforms is necessary for any to receive majority support. Delayed reforms are often preferred, but immediate tax hikes or slower benefit growth win in some circumstances. Inter-generational AND intragenerational heterogeneity of economic interests combine to affect which reforms are blocked and which are feasible.

JEL-codes: H55 H62 H68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
Note: AG PE POL
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