Formal Employment and Organized Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia
Gaurav Khanna,
Carlos Medina,
Anant Nyshadham and
Jorge A. Tamayo
No 26203, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
Canonical models of crime emphasize economic incentives. Yet, causal evidence of sorting into criminal occupations in response to individual-level variation in incentives is limited. We link administrative socioeconomic microdata with the universe of arrests in Medellín over a decade. We exploit exogenous variation in formal-sector employment around a socioeconomic-score cutoff, below which individuals receive benefits if not formally employed, to test whether a higher cost to formal-sector employment induces crime. Regression discontinuity estimates show this policy generated reductions in formal-sector employment and a corresponding spike in organized crime, but no effects on crimes of impulse or opportunity.
JEL-codes: J24 J46 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-lma and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
Published as Gaurav Khanna & Carlos Medina & Anant Nyshadham & Jorge Tamayo & Nicolas Torres, 2023. "Formal Employment and Organised Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(654), pages 2427-2448.
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Journal Article: Formal Employment and Organised Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia (2023) 
Working Paper: Formal Employment and Organized Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia (2019) 
Working Paper: Formal Employment and Organized Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia (2019) 
Working Paper: Formal Employment and Organized Crime: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Colombia (2018) 
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