Putting Global Governance in its Place

Dani Rodrik

No 26213, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In a world economy that is highly integrated, most policies produce effects across the border. This is often believed to be an argument for greater global governance, but the logic requires scrutiny. There remains strong revealed demand for policy and institutional diversity among nations, rooted in differences in historical, cultural, or development trajectories. The canonical case for global governance is based on two set of circumstances. The first occurs when there is global public good (GPG) and the second under “beggar-thy-neighbor” (BTN) policies. However, the world economy is not a global commons, and virtually no economic policy has the nature of a global public good (or bad). And while there are some important BTN policies, much of our current discussions deal with policies that are not true BTNs. The policy failures that exist arise not from weaknesses of global governance, but from distortions of domestic governance. As a general rule, these domestic failures cannot be fixed through international agreements or multilateral cooperation. The paper closes by discussing an alternative model of global governance called “democracy-enhancing global governance.”

JEL-codes: F50 F60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Published as Dani Rodrik, 2020. "Putting Global Governance in Its Place," The World Bank Research Observer, vol 35(1), pages 1-18.

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Journal Article: Putting Global Governance in Its Place (2020)
Working Paper: Putting Global Governance in its Place (2019)
Working Paper: Putting Global Governance in its Place (2019)
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