Drug Diffusion Through Peer Networks: The Influence of Industry Payments

Leila Agha and Dan Zeltzer

No 26338, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Pharmaceutical companies market to physicians through individual detailing accompanied by monetary or in-kind transfers. Large compensation payments to a small number of physicians account for most of this promotional spending. Studying US promotional payments and prescriptions for anticoagulant drugs, we investigate how peer influence broadens the payments’ reach. Following a compensation payment, prescriptions for the marketed drug increase by both the paid physician and the paid physician’s peers. Payments increase prescriptions to both recommended and contraindicated patients. Over three years, marketed anticoagulant prescriptions rose 23 percent due to payments, with peer spillovers contributing a quarter of the increase.

JEL-codes: I11 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-net, nep-pay and nep-soc
Note: AG EH IO PE PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published as Leila Agha & Dan Zeltzer, 2022. "Drug Diffusion through Peer Networks: The Influence of Industry Payments," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol 14(2), pages 1-33.

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Journal Article: Drug Diffusion through Peer Networks: The Influence of Industry Payments (2022)
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