Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

Alex Rees-Jones, Ran Shorrer and Chloe J. Tergiman

No 26734, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present results from experiments containing incentivized school-choice scenarios. In these scenarios, we vary whether schools’ assessments of students are based on a common priority (inducing correlation in admissions decisions) or are based on independent assessments (eliminating correlation in admissions decisions). The quality of students’ application strategies declines in the presence of correlated admissions: application strategies become substantially more aggressive and fail to include attractive “safety” options. We provide a battery of tests suggesting that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, and we discuss implications for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms.

JEL-codes: C91 D01 D03 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published as Alex Rees-Jones & Ran Shorrer & Chloe Tergiman, 2024. "Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol 16(3), pages 1-42.

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