A Quantitative Analysis of Distortions in Managerial Forecasts
Yueran Ma,
Tiziano Ropele,
David Sraer and
David Thesmar
No 26830, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
This paper quantifies the economic costs of distortions in managerial forecasts. We match a unique managerial survey run by the Bank of Italy with administrative data on firm balance sheets and income statements. The resulting dataset allows us to observe a long panel of managerial forecast errors for a sample of firms representative of the Italian economy. We show that managerial forecast errors are positively and significantly autocorrelated. This persistence in forecast error is consistent with managerial underreaction to new information. To quantify the economic significance of this forecasting bias, we estimate a dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and distorted expectations. The estimated model matches not only the persistence of forecast errors, but the empirical link between investment and managerial forecasts. Relative to a counterfactual with rational expectations, we find that managers exhibit large forecasting biases, which lead to significant distortions in firm-level investment. These distortions, however, imply limited loss in firm value. In general equilibrium, the estimated model leads to negligible aggregate efficiency losses from distorted forecasts.
JEL-codes: E03 E22 E7 E70 E71 G02 G3 G31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-hrm and nep-mac
Note: CF EFG PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w26830.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26830
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w26830
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (wpc@nber.org).