Optimal Bailouts and the Doom Loop with a Financial Network

Agostino Capponi, Felix C. Corell and Joseph Stiglitz

No 27074, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Banks usually hold large amounts of domestic debt which makes them vulnerable to their own sovereign's default risk. At the same time, governments often resort to costly bailouts when their banking sector is in trouble. We investigate how the network structure and the distribution of ownership of sovereign debt within the banking sector jointly affect the optimal bailout policy under this “doom loop”. We argue that rescuing banks with high domestic sovereign exposure is optimal if these banks are sufficiently central, even though that requires larger bailout expenditures than rescuing otherwise identical low-exposure banks. Our model illustrates how the “doom loop” exacerbates the “too interconnected to fail” problem.

JEL-codes: G01 G21 G28 H63 H81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba and nep-net
Note: TWP
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Agostino Capponi & Felix Corell & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2022. "Optimal Bailouts and the Doom Loop with a Financial Network," Journal of Monetary Economics, .

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