Incentivizing Behavioral Change: The Role of Time Preferences

Shilpa Aggarwal, Rebecca Dizon-Ross and Ariel Zucker

No 27079, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: How should the design of incentives vary with agent time preferences? We develop two predictions. First, “bundling” the payment function over time – specifically by making the payment for future effort increase in current effort – is more effective if individuals are impatient over effort. Second, increasing the frequency of payment is more effective if individuals are impatient over payment. We test the efficacy of time-bundling and payment frequency, and their interactions with impatience, using a randomized evaluation of an incentive program for exercise among diabetics in India. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, bundling payments over time meaningfully increases effort among the impatient relative to the patient. In contrast, increasing payment frequency has limited efficacy, suggesting limited impatience over payments. On average, incentives increase daily steps by 1,266 (13 minutes of brisk walking) and improve health.

JEL-codes: D9 I12 I15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-upt
Note: DEV EH LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Incentivizing Behavioral Change: The Role of Time Preferences (2020)
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