Steering Incentives of Platforms: Evidence from the Telecommunications Industry
Brian McManus,
Aviv Nevo,
Zachary Nolan and
Jonathan W. Williams
No 27083, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We study the trade-offs faced by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that serve as platforms through which consumers access both television and internet services. As online streaming video improves, these providers may respond by attempting to steer consumers away from streaming video toward their own TV services, or by attempting to capture surplus from this improved internet content. We augment the standard mixed bundling model to demonstrate the trade-offs the ISP faces when dealing with streaming video, and we show how these trade-offs change with the pricing options available to the ISP. Next, we use unique household-level panel data and the introduction of usage-based pricing (UBP) in a subset of markets to measure consumers' responses and to evaluate quantitatively the ISP's trade-offs. We find that the introduction of UBP led consumers to upgrade their internet service plans and lower overall internet usage. Our findings suggest that while steering consumers towards TV services is possible, it is likely costly for the ISP and therefore unlikely to be profitable. This is especially true if the ISP can offer rich pricing menus that allow it to capture some of the surplus generated by a better internet service. The results suggest that policies like UBP can increase ISPs' incentive to maintain open access to new internet content.
JEL-codes: L11 L13 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ict, nep-ind, nep-pay and nep-reg
Note: IO PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27083.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27083
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27083
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().